The basal ganglia select the expected sensory input used for predictive coding by Brian Colder
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 23 September 2015
doi: 10.3389/fncom.2015.00119
The basal ganglia select the
expected sensory input used
for predictive coding
Brian Colder*
Colder Scientific, McLean, VA, USA
Edited by:
Sophie Deneve,
Collège de France, France
Reviewed by:
J Michael Herrmann,
UoE, UK
Ran Rubin,
Columbia University, USA
*Correspondence:
Brian Colder,
Colder Scientific,
1553 Mary Ellen Court, McLean,
22101 VA, USA
briancolder@yahoo.com
Received: 31 August 2014
Accepted: 08 September 2015
Published: 23 September 2015
Citation:
Colder B (2015) The basal ganglia
select the expected sensory input
used for predictive coding.
Front. Comput. Neurosci. 9:119.
doi: 10.3389/fncom.2015.00119
While considerable evidence supports the notion that lower-level interpretation of
incoming sensory information is guided by top-down sensory expectations, less
is known about the source of the sensory expectations or the mechanisms by
which they are spread. Predictive coding theory proposes that sensory expectations
flow down from higher-level association areas to lower-level sensory cortex. A
separate theory of the role of prediction in cognition describes “emulations” as
linked representations of potential actions and their associated expected sensation
that are hypothesized to play an important role in many aspects of cognition.
The expected sensations in active emulations are proposed to be the top-
down expectation used in predictive coding. Representations of the potential
action and expected sensation in emulations are claimed to be instantiated in
distributed cortical networks. Combining predictive coding with emulations thus
provides a theoretical link between the top-down expectations that guide sensory
expectations and the cortical networks representing potential actions. Now moving
to theories of action selection, the basal ganglia has long been proposed to
select between potential actions by reducing inhibition to the cortical network
instantiating the desired action plan. Integration of these isolated theories leads
to the novel hypothesis that reduction in inhibition from the basal ganglia selects
not just action plans, but entire emulations, including the sensory input expected
to result from the action. Basal ganglia disinhibition is hypothesized to both
initiate an action and also allow propagation of the action’s associated sensory
expectation down towards primary sensory cortex. This is a novel proposal for
the role of the basal ganglia in biasing perception by selecting the expected
sensation, and initiating the top-down transmission of those expectations in predictive
coding.
Keywords: basal ganglia, predictive coding, action selection, cortical networks, emulation, top-down and
bottom-up interaction, expectations, prediction
Prediction in Perception
The importance of predictions in cognition has been extensively reviewed in recent neuroscience
and cognitive science literature (Grush, 2004; Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004; Friston and
Stephan, 2007; Pezzulo et al., 2008; Bar, 2009; Bubic et al., 2010; Colder, 2011; Clark,
2013). Sensory perception is thought to result from the neural combination of ‘‘top-down’’
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sensory expectations with ‘‘bottom-up’’ information from
sensory organs (Bar, 2007; Panichello et al., 2013). In particular,
the term ‘‘predictive coding’’ describes the theory that sensory
expectations flow down from higher-level association areas
to lower-level sensory cortex, and deviations from those
expectations (error signals) flow back up to association areas
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Huang and Rao, 2011). Recent
empirical evidence supporting predictive coding, (reviewed in
Egner and Summerfield, 2013) include brain imaging results
demonstrating increased activity in primary visual cortex in
response to unexpected stimuli (Alink et al., 2010), and
increases in the differentiation in the primary visual cortex
responses to houses and faces as stimulus predictability decreases
(Egner et al., 2010).
While the studies cited above, and others, support the notion
that lower-level interpretation of incoming sensory information
is guided by top-down sensory expectations, less is known about
the source of the sensory expectations or the mechanisms by
which they are spread. The ‘‘reafference principle’’ (von Holst
and Mittelstaedt, 1950) states that copies of motor commands
(‘‘efference copies’’ or ‘‘corollary discharge’’) are transmitted
to sensory processing regions so that the sensation resulting
from those actions (the ‘‘reafference’’) can be ‘‘subtracted out’’
from the stream of incoming sensory information. Corollary
discharge is used to anticipate and ignore the visual blur that
occurs during high-speed saccades (Ross et al., 2001) and to
inhibit the cricket’s auditory system response to self-generated
noise (Poulet and Hedwig, 2006). Along with alerting the sensory
system to very specific information that should be ignored or
accounted for, corollary dischargemay also providemore general
information about potential actions that could be used to guide
sensation.
Perception is an ongoing process, requiring a constant flow
of top-down expectations to guide interpretation of incoming
sensation. Action selection is also an ongoing process, and since
action selection must consider predictions for the environment
that would result from the action, each representation of a
potential action must be tied to a sensory expectation. These
action-dependent environmental predictions may serve as the
top-down sensory expectations used in predictive coding.
Link Between Potential Action and
Expected Sensation
Prediction is a critical aspect of action planning and execution
(for a review, see Mehta and Schaal, 2002). For instance, a
constant downward force can produce the illusion of an increase
in force if visual information leads to a prediction that the
sensation of force should decrease (Diedrichsen et al., 2007).
Also, trans-cranial magnetic stimulation over the cerebellum
leads to reaching errors that suggest the cerebellum holds
an estimate of future limb position (Miall et al., 2007).
A classic theory of motor cortex states that motor cortex
represents images of potential achievement, and continuously
monitors progress toward those future goals (Pribram, 1971).
The description of motor cortex function by Pribram (1971),
based on anatomical and neurophysiological studies of the
spinal cord, cerebellum, and motor cortex, emphasizes the
similarities between neural representations of action plans and
expected sensory states. Similarly, ‘‘common coding theory’’
(Prinz, 1997) explicitly states that perceived events and potential
actions are represented in the same manner. Prinz (1997)
also introduces the ‘‘action-effect’’ hypothesis, which holds that
action planning depends on the expected outcomes of the
potential actions. More recently, Friston suggests that motor
intentions are tied to sensory predictions, and actions are
designed to elicit sensory proprioceptive predictions (Friston,
2003, 2011). Clark (2013) describes this work as ‘‘action-oriented
predictive processing’’.
Further theoretical support for a strong link between
planned actions and their expected sensation comes from Gross
et al. (1999), who present a theory and model of generative
perception based on the integration of action plans and their
expected future sensory consequences. In addition, Grush (2004,
2007—skill theory v 2.0) introduces the ‘‘emulation framework’’
to explain how cognition might generate and use predictions
of the sensory environment that would result from specific
actions. As used here, the term ‘‘emulation’’ describes a single
entity made up of the linked representations of a potential
action and its expected sensory result. Empirical support for
the link between potential actions and predicted outcome
comes from a recent study that found anticipatory activity
from single cell discharges in rat thalamus, and primary
sensory and motor cortex, when rats explored the size of an
aperture (Pais-Vieira et al., 2013). This anticipatory activity was
disrupted when motor cortex was de-activated with muscimol,
indicating that motor cortical activity was important for
maintaining predictive representations in thalamus and sensory
cortex.
The close ties between potential actions and the predictions
for sensation those actions would produce led Colder (2011)
to hypothesize that it was the sensory expectations in active
emulations that were passed down to primary sensory cortices in
the process of predictive coding. While Colder (2011) describes
a theoretical source of top-down sensory expectations for
perception, insight into how those expectations may be spread
to lower-level cortices is still lacking. The link between potential
actions and their predicted sensations suggests that the process
of action selection may also be involved in spreading sensory
expectations. To understand how action selection might spread
predicted sensation, first we must consider how emulations are
instantiated in neuronal networks.
Parallel, Distributed Networks Instantiate
Emulations
Fuster (2006, 2009), proposed that cortical representations of
actions and sensory states are instantiated in ‘‘cognits’’, or widely
distributed neuronal networks. Emulations are hypothesized to
be implemented in cognits consisting of neurons distributed
widely throughout cortex (Colder, 2011). Similar to working
memories (Fuster, 2006), emulations are hypothesized to
be generated by partial sensory cues that activate neural
networks associated with long-term memories. Emulations may
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begin as more abstract plans and more uncertain sensory
expectations (e.g., considering whether to head to the park
in the afternoon), in which case active cognits will include
neurons from anterior portions of PFC, and higher-level sensory
association areas, but few neurons from primary motor or
sensory areas. Alternatively, if newly generated emulations
include concrete, immediate plans and very specific sensory
expectations (e.g., jumping out of the way of an oncoming bus),
their initial active cognits will include primary sensory andmotor
regions.
Figure 1 demonstrates the distributed nature of the active
neuronal networks that instantiate emulations. The neural
network for the notional abstract emulation depicted in the
Figure includes neurons in frontal motor association areas
whose activity corresponds to the emulation’s potential action.
The emulation’s network also includes neurons in parietal and
temporal sensory association areas whose activity corresponds to
the expected sensory outcome of the potential action.
Many emulations may be simultaneously instantiated in
parallel, distributed neural networks. This proposal follows
the notion that association cortices are comprised of parallel,
segregated networks as described by Goldman-Rakic (1988).
Recent evidence supporting the idea of physically widespread
neural networks as basic units of representation comes from a
study of cortical connectivity finding interdigitated, functional
networks distributed throughout the cortex (Yeo et al., 2011).
Continuous competition among emulations may be driven
by incoming sensory information that defines the expected
outcome of actions. In a visual discrimination task requiring
saccades, activity in motor cortex reflects the continuous
accumulation of sensory information that indicates the choice
with best expected outcome (Gold and Shadlen, 2000). More
recently, cortico-spinal excitability for action pathways was
found to vary with the value of the action (Klein-Flügge and
Bestmann, 2012). Incoming sensory information is important
not only for updating the expected outcome of actions, but
also for specifying which actions are physically possible at a
given moment. Cisek (2007) proposes that incoming sensory
information drives a continuous competition among potential
actions, or ‘‘affordances’’, by continuously updating the set of
viable affordances.
Since emulations are instantiated in cortex as distributed
neural networks, neural network operations govern the spread
and shrinkage of emulation influence. In particular, spreading
sensory expectations to lower-level sensory cortices requires
activating lower-level sensory cortical neurons that are connected
to the neurons instantiating the higher-level representation of
the sensory expectation. Theories of action selection (discussed
below) describe how the basal ganglia interact with cortical
networks instantiating potential actions to allow the spread of
the chosen network and action. The same mechanism can also
serve to spread the network instantiating the sensory expectation
associated with the action.
Basal Ganglia Gate Actions from Within
Cortical-BG-Thalamo-Cortical Information
Loops
Tract-tracing studies indicate that information flows from
cortex through the basal ganglia and thalamus and back to
cortex in mainly segregated loops (Alexander et al., 1986;
Middleton and Strick, 2002) although there is some integration
of information between loops (Haber and Calzavara, 2009).
Although most empirical evidence demonstrates information
loops between BG and PFC, retrograde labeling of the substantia
nigra pars reticulata (SNr) reveals projections through thalamus
FIGURE 1 | The figure shows the cortical surface with an overlay of the basal ganglia and thalamus. The blue dots on the cortical surface represent the
neuronal activity for a notional emulation. This emulation is abstract, and the active neural networks instantiating the emulation are in higher-level motor and sensory
association areas of the brain.
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FIGURE 2 | The yellow dots represent activity in a neural network instantiating another notional emulation that also has activity in higher-level
association areas of the brain. The blue and yellow emulations contain different potential actions and expected outcomes. Multiple emulations are hypothesized
to compete for realization at any given time.
to the inferotemporal cortex as well (Middleton and Strick,
1996), suggesting the existence of closed information loops
from all parts of cortex through the BG and back to cortex.
Figure 2 depicts the cortical-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical
loops for inferotemporal cortex for notional blue and yellow
emulations.
The neural networks for both emulations have closed-loop
connections with the basal ganglia and thalamus. The arrows
shown indicate the excitatory input from one sensory association
cortical region to the basal ganglia, and the excitatory path back
from the thalamus to cortex. Information in these loops travels
multiple pathways though the basal ganglia to reach thalamus
and then return to cortex. Basal ganglia GO pathways increase
excitation in cortical neural networks, while NoGo pathways
decrease cortical excitation. Note that the neural networks
in other cortical regions (e.g., pre-frontal cortex, and parietal
sensory association areas) are also a part of similar cortical-basal
ganglia- thalamic loops.
Role of Cortical-BG-Thalamo-Cortical
Information Loops in Action Gating
The BG play an important role in determining which of many
possible actions might be performed (Mink, 1996; Redgrave
et al., 1999). Mink (1996) hypothesized that once a movement
is initiated in cortex, pathways from cortex through the
BG decrease inhibition for the selected action, and increase
inhibition on competing actions, allowing for the smooth
execution of the selected action.
Whereas Mink (1996) and Redgrave et al. (1999) suggested
that the BG select actions by disinhibiting the cortical portion
of a cortical-BG-thalamo-cortical information loop containing
an action plan, I propose that the information loops operate
on not just action plans, but complete emulations, including
the expected resulting sensation associated with action plans.
Therefore the same mechanism hypothesized by Mink (1996)
and Redgrave et al. (1999) to select actions is also selecting
expected sensation.
BG Go and NoGo Pathways
There are multiple pathways information could travel through
the BG in a cortical-BG-thalamo-cortical information loop
(Schroll and Hamker, 2013). For all pathways, the final
connection, from thalamus to cortex, is excitatory. The preceding
connection is inhibitory output from the BG [from either the
globus pallidus internus (GPi) or SNr] to the thalamus. As a
result, the BG provide a varying inhibitory influence on an
excitatory connection from thalamus to cortex.
One of these pathways, the ‘‘direct’’ pathway through the BG
includes an excitatory signal from the cortex to the striatum,
which then sends an inhibitory signal to the BG output nuclei. As
a result, activation of the direct pathway results in a decrease of
BG output, producing less inhibition of the thalamus and cortex.
The direct pathway was termed the ‘‘Go’’ pathway by Hazy et al.
(2007). There are also multiple ‘‘NoGo’’ pathways through the
BG. These pathways ultimately produce increases in inhibition
from the BG to the thalamus, resulting in less cortical excitation
(see review in Schroll and Hamker, 2013).
Mink (1996) and Hazy et al. (2007) suggested that actions
are selected when Go pathway activation for the cortico-
BG-thalamo-cortical loop disinhibits the selected PFC action
representation, at the same time as NoGo activity increases
for competing actions in different information loops. Both
Go and NoGo pathways were recently found to be active
during normal movement (Cui et al., 2013), supporting the
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concept that action selection results from changes in the
activation of each pathway relative to the other. Figure 3
shows some of the pathways information travels through
the BG in cortical-BG-thalamo-cortical loops. Information
about the blue emulation is moving on GO pathways,
while the yellow emulation is being deselected by NO GO
pathways.
Proposal for Emulation Realization via
Recruitment of “Actualization” Neurons
Following Mink (1996) and Hazy et al. (2007), I propose that a
decrease in inhibition caused by excitation of BG Go pathway
promotes selected emulations (potential action/expected
sensation pairs) by increasing the firing rate in their instantiating
neural network, while simultaneously BG NoGo pathways
deliver increased cortical inhibition to competing emulations.
Although there are many influences on cortical neural
networks, this BG-produced relative increase in firing rate
of the network for the action in the selected emulation allows
the network to recruit more caudal/posterior neurons in
PFC. This recruitment advances the activity in the selected
action’s neural network toward the motor cortex and eventual
execution. Thus, action selection results from BG disinhibition
of emulations and their cortical networks that allows recruitment
of more caudal/posterior PFC neurons, including motor strip
neurons.
But since potential actions and expected sensations are linked,
a decrease in inhibition for an emulation also increases the
activation of the emulation’s posterior cortical network, allowing
the network to recruit neurons that are physically closer to
primary sensory cortices. This recruitment is the top-down
dissemination of the emulation’s sensory expectations on lower-
level sensory areas, and it is the implementation of predictive
coding. BG disinhibition of preferred emulations and their
distributed cortical networks is thus proposed to allow the
spread of top-down expectations that shape ongoing perception.
Figure 4 shows that since excitatory input from thalamus has
increased for the blue emulation, the active neural networks for
that emulation have recruited more neurons. Activity for the
blue emulation has spread to primary motor cortex, meaning
that the emulation’s action is being performed. Neural networks
instantiating the blue emulation have also spread to primary
somato-sensory cortex and primary visual cortex, indicating that
the emulation’s sensory expectations are being used to interpret
incoming sensation.
FIGURE 3 | In this figure, basal ganglia GO pathways are shown in blue, and they are selecting the “blue” emulation, while NO GO pathways are
shown in yellow deselecting the “yellow” emulation. Arrows that are outlined in black denote an excitatory connection, while red-outlined arrows represent an
inhibitory connection. Pathway 1 is a NO GO pathway that includes an inhibitory connection from the striatum to the globus pallidus externus (GPe), an inhibitory
connection from the GPe to the globus pallidus internus (GPi), and an inhibitory connection to the thalamus. Pathway 2 is a GO pathway that has an inhibitory
connection from the striatum to the GPi, and an inhibitory connection from the GPi to the thalamus. Pathway 3 is a NO GO pathway that contains an inhibitory
connection from the striatum to the GPe, an inhibitory connection from the GPe to the subthalamic nucleus (STn), an excitatory connection from STn to GPi, and an
inhibitory connection from GPi to thalamus. Pathway 4 is a GO pathway that has an inhibitory connection from the striatum to the substantia nigra pars reticulata
(SNr), and an inhibitory connection from SNr to thalamus. Instead of starting in the striatum, Pathway 5 is a NO GO pathway that includes an excitatory connection
directly from cortex the STn, an excitatory connection from STn to GPi, and an inhibitory connection from GPi to thalamus. Note that the pathways shown are just a
selected subset of all the possible pathways information can travel through the basal ganglia in a cortical-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop. See Schroll and
Hamker (2013) for a review of basal ganglia pathways.
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FIGURE 4 | The increased activity in the neural networks instantiating
the blue emulation allows those neural networks to recruit neurons in
lower-level sensory and motor areas. The spreading of the emulation
sends the action plan to the motor strip, which initiates the emulation’s
potential action. The spread of the emulation to primary sensory cortices is the
top-down propagation of the sensory expectations in the emulation, as
described in predictive coding theory.
Assumption that Cortical Networks
Compete for Lower-Level Neurons
The theory described above depends on an important
assumption about the spread of representations implemented
in distributed cortical networks. While output from the basal
ganglia is just one of many sources of excitation or inhibition
for the neural networks instantiating emulations, the proposed
mechanism for moving an emulation toward realization is that
the emulation’s neuronal network is able to recruit lower-level
neurons by virtue of its being disinhibited by the BG relative
to competing emulations/networks. The assumption implicit in
this mechanism is that the relative decrease in BG inhibition
will increase the discharge rate of neurons in the distributed
network, and that this increase in neuronal activity (compared to
other networks) enhances the network’s ability to expand. This
assumption will hold up in a scenario where lower-level sensory
and motor neurons are constantly ‘‘in demand’’ by multiple
cortical networks/emulations that are all competing to access
lower-level neurons so that the emulations can ‘‘become reality’’.
Note that action plans will become reality if neurons in
primary motor cortex discharge in accord with the plan, causing
the body to execute the action. The expected resulting sensory
input might not always occur, but imposing expectations tends
to bias perception toward the expected sensations (for reviews,
see Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Seriès and Seitz, 2013). The
importance of expectations in affecting perception was recently
affirmed by a psychophysical study in which subjects tended to
perceive random dot rotation in the expected direction, even
when actual dot motion was completely ambiguous (Sterzer et al.,
2008). In another task requiring subjects to press a button when
a moving ball was at a specific location, subjects were found
to consistently underestimate their own errors relative to errors
they believed to be made by others (Wolpe et al., 2014). The
authors interpret these findings as indicating that subjects had a
prior expectation of successful task completion that biased their
perception of their actual performance. These studies support
the notion that a cortical network able to recruit lower-level
sensory neurons would bias the organism towards experiencing
the emulation’s sensory prediction as reality.
The idea that distributed networks based mainly in
association cortex compete for neurons in lower-level sensory
and motor areas is supported by imaging studies demonstrating
increased activation in more anterior PFC as tasks became more
complex (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007).
Koechlin et al. (2003) explained these results using a ‘‘cascade
model’’ of control in the PFC, in which representations at lower
(more caudal) levels are controlled by representations at higher
(more rostral) levels. Badre and D’Esposito (2007) also noted a
general increase in baseline activity in more posterior areas of
PFC when more anterior, higher-level areas become engaged.
This increase in baseline in lower-level areas is consistent with
the notion that abstract action plans implemented in networks
that include anterior PFC compete for lower-level neurons in
more posterior regions of PFC. Reviews by Fuster (2009) and
O’Reilly (2010) conclude that action execution begins with
abstract, complex representations in anterior PFC and proceeds
to concrete representations and specific movements controlled
by posterior PFC. Redgrave et al. (1999) also assumed that
multiple action plans competed for access to motor effectors,
and proposed the BG as the action plan selector.
Novel Proposal for the Role of BG in
Perception
The theory of BG function described above is drawn directly
from hypotheses for the role of the BG in action selection (Mink,
1996; Redgrave et al., 1999; Hwang, 2013). Integrating these
hypotheses with the notion that potential actions are bound
to their expected resulting sensation, and also with theories of
the role of expectations in perception suggests the novel role
of the BG in also selecting and initiating top-down sensory
expectations, and hence influencing perception.
Although BG disinhibition has not been previously suggested
as the mechanism for propagating sensory expectations, there
is considerable recent evidence suggesting that the BG play an
important role in perception (reviewed in Ding and Gold, 2013).
Single cell recordings from the caudate revealed the presence
of neurons whose discharge rates tended to predict perceptual
choices, especially when the sensory evidence for the choice
was relatively weaker (Ding and Gold, 2010). In support of the
current theory, these neurons appear to act like a source of top-
down bias to lower-level sensory areas. Also, micro-stimulation
of the caudate nucleus during a perceptual decision task induced
a decision preference opposite to that preferred by neighboring
caudate neurons (Ding and Gold, 2012). The authors use these
results to suggest that the direct and indirect pathways could have
opposite effects on perceptual decisions.
Multiple authors have previously modeled BG computations
involving perception. Rao (2010) describes a model in which
the BG select actions based on previously learned responses to
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 119
Colder Basal Ganglia Selects between Alternate Futures
Bayesian belief states represented in cortex. The belief states
and learned actions described by Rao (2010) are similar to
emulations. Bogacz and Gurney (2007) and Lepora and Gurney
(2012) suggest that the BG optimally select actions based on
associated perceptual hypotheses. The associations of actions and
perceptual hypotheses used in those models are also similar to
emulations.
General Discussion
I propose that the internal Go and NoGo pathways of the
BG select between multiple alternate futures (emulations)
that are implemented in distributed cortical networks and
cortical-BG-thalamo-cortical information loops. The result of
this selection is the disinhibition of selected cortical networks,
allowing them to recruit lower-level sensory and motor neurons,
which has the effect of advancing the selected emulation
to actualization, including spreading the emulation’s sensory
expectation. Although previous authors have made similar
proposals to describe how actions are selected, a novel aspect of
this proposal is that BG disinhibition initiates the spread of top-
down sensory expectations that are known to play an important
role in perception. The hypothesis depends on the assumption
that the neural networks instantiating emulations compete for
access to lower-level neurons that can implement the emulation’s
potential action and sensory expectations.
This hypothesis derives from previous research and theory
indicating the role of the BG’s Go and NoGo pathways in
action selection, combined with another body of literature
describing the importance of prediction in cognition, including
predictive coding in perception. Extending the BG’s role in
action selection to a more general role for selecting between
alternate futures follows naturally from the notion that action
plan representations are linked to representations of the resulting
expected sensation to create complete future scenarios. This
assumption agrees with Pribram (1971), who suggested that
action plan representations are just the expected sensory
outcome, including the state of muscle spindle cells, after
the action has been performed. In this view, also shared by
Friston (2003, 2011), action planning is based on sensory
representations, and a sequence of actions can be conceived as
a series of expected sensations that include signals of muscle
position. The present hypothesis goes beyond these theories
relating potential actions and expected sensation, as well as
Prinz (1997)’s common coding theory, by presenting a candidate
mechanism, BG disinhibition, for the selection of actions and the
propagation of expectations.
The hypothesis that action selection occurs as BG-disinhibited
cortical networks recruit neurons closer to primary motor cortex
stands in contrast to the proposal from Rizzolatti and Luppino
(2001) that prefrontal ‘‘control areas’’ with a predominance of
prefrontal connections determine when activity in more parietal-
connected, posterior frontal cortex leads to action. Perhaps these
hypotheses are in agreement if cortical-BG-cortical networks
that originate from prefrontal ‘‘control areas’’ are initially
disinhibited, leading to recruitment of more posterior prefrontal
networks.
BG Role in Predicting Reward
Evidence that the BG track the outcomes of actions—including
reward information—supports the hypothesis that the BG
select emulations that include expected sensation. The BG are
known to encode reward prediction errors (O’Doherty et al.,
2004). Individual anterior caudate neurons encode both reward
and task information (Yanike and Ferrera, 2014). Neurons in
the caudate, putamen and ventral striatum showed activity
related to the magnitude of the expected reward (Cromwell
and Schultz, 2003). Also, caudate neurons have been found
that are sensitive to the size of the expected reward and
their output may produce a bias in the superior colliculus
that influences saccadic output (Hikosaka et al., 2006). More
recently, multiple, distinct relationships between reward size
and baseline neuronal discharge characteristics were found in
recordings from neurons throughout the caudate (Nakamura
et al., 2012).
From the perspective of the current hypothesis, reward is
an important part of the more general expected sensation
resulting from an action plan. Ding and Gold (2013) speculate
that expectations of reward might be combined with other
anticipated sensory information to aid in perceptual decisions.
Exact mechanisms of how reward and other aspects of the
expected sensory environment influence the BG’s Go and NoGo
pathway calculations of inhibition for individual emulations and
cortical-BG-thalamo-cortical information loops are yet to be
determined.
Potential Changes to Computational
Models of BG Function
Previous models focused on the role of the BG in action
selection (Hazy et al., 2007), gating of working memory (Frank
et al., 2001) and the reinforcement learning needed to guide
action selection (Hazy et al., 2006; Rao, 2010; Bolado-Gomez
and Gurney, 2013). Other research has included modeling BG
and cortex performance on perceptual decisions using models
that assume sensory evidence is passively accumulated until
a decision is reached (Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Lepora and
Gurney, 2012). The hypothesis that the BG initiate top-down
sensory expectations suggests a novel addition to models of
BG function, that BG disinhibition should encourage selected
perceptual hypotheses before all sensory evidence is obtained,
creating a bias that tends to influence perception towards
those hypotheses. Thus, instead of passively accumulating
evidence, models of the BG’s role in perceptual decisions
might include terms that accelerate progress towards a specific
decision after evidence supporting that decision has been
observed.
Testing the Hypothesis
The proposed hypothesis incorporates established theories of
action selection by the BG, while emphasizing the link between
representations of action plans and the anticipated sensation
resulting from those plans. A large body of empirical evidence
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already exists describing how BG activity is linked to action
selection. Therefore key tests of this hypothesis would shed
light on the BG’s role in establishing sensory expectations.
Informative experiments could manipulate the Go and NoGo
pathways in the BG and measure the resulting effect on
sensory expectations. For instance, there are two different NoGo
pathways that pass through the subthalamic nucleus (STn;
Schroll and Hamker, 2013), the indirect pathway [cortex to
striatum to globus pallidus externus (GPe) to STn to GPi], and
the hyperdirect pathway (cortex to STn to GPi). Reducing the
effectiveness of the STn by electrical, chemical or mechanical
means during the presentation of informative stimuli should
disrupt these NoGo pathways. According to the proposed
hypothesis, this disruption would result in a lack of inhibition
for competing actions and expectations, which will decrease
the top-down guidance for interpretation of incoming sensory
stimuli.
Physiological measurements can provide indirect evidence of
sensory expectations. For instance, Summerfield et al. (2006)
found fMRI activity that corresponded to specific ‘‘perceptual
sets’’ in a visual recognition task with degraded stimuli, and
many studies have demonstrated modulation of cortical single
neuronal firing patterns by anticipated reward (for example,
Rosenkilde et al., 1981; Shuler and Bear, 2006; Burton et al.,
2013; Stanis,or et al., 2013). If BG disinhibition is responsible
for spreading sensory expectations as described above, then
inactivating the BG should reduce the neurophysiological
changes corresponding to lower-level sensory expectations,
including reward expectations. That is, while ‘‘reward cells’’
may still be found in pre-frontal cortex and sensory association
cortices, it should not be possible to observe reward cells
in primary sensory and motor cortices when the BG are
inactivated. Alternatively, if the activity of just the STn of
the BG was experimentally decreased, then the effectiveness
of the NoGo pathway should be degraded, allowing incorrect
expectations to propagate. In this case it may be possible
to see reward cell activity even when rewards are not
expected.
The degree to which an individual’s sensory expectations
match incoming stimuli can also be inferred using behavioral
measures such as reaction time or percent correct responses.
However, it is difficult to obtain behavioral data on sensory
expectations that is not confounded with selected actions—both
a misperception and an incorrectly selected action will produce
the same result, an incorrect choice. Specific tests of the proposed
role of the BG in selecting and advancing potential sensation (as
opposed to selecting action plans) must dissociate selection of
sensory expectations from selection of an action plan. Perhaps
this could be accomplished in a behavioral experiment by
requiring the same response for all stimuli and measuring how
changes in reaction time vary with manipulations of sensory
expectations and BG function.
The experiments described above suggest the use of
laboratory methods to manipulate BG function. Further evidence
bearing on the hypothesis could come from ‘‘natural lesion’’
studies of patients with BG dysfunction that affects the
motor system, such as Parkinson’s or diseases producing
chorea. Since the current hypothesis supposes that the BG
are involved in propagating sensory expectations, patients
with BG dysfunction might be expected to show perceptual
problems related to inaccurate sensory predictions. In fact,
in an experiment on attentional set shifting, Cools et al.
(2010) found that patients with Parkinson’s disease relied
more on bottom-up stimulus characteristics—and less on top-
down expectations—than did normal controls. Further testing is
needed to determine if a reduced emphasis on top-down sensory
expectation is a common feature of patients with BG-related
disease.
Application of the Emulation Framework
Colder (2011) proposed a theory of prediction in cognition
that provided a general emulation-based framework for
understanding cognitive neuroscience research. Placing studies
of the BG into the emulation framework supports the current
re-interpretation of findings that have previously been used to
link the BG to action selection, resulting in the more general
theory that the BG select between alternate potential futures.
This is an example of how the emulation framework can
offer a context for cognitive neuroscience research that may
provide additional insight into the implications of research
results.
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